

**Core Theoretical Philosophy I and II**

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This course offers an advanced survey of some central themes in contemporary theoretical philosophy, drawn from recent work in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of mind, language, and science. While it is designed to provide background for those who pursue graduate-level research in these areas, it is not an introductory course. (Those who do not have some undergraduate preparation in these areas are advised to discuss remedial work with the course directors as soon as possible.)

**Requirements and Evaluation**

All students are required to complete the required readings, submit the essays and/or paper, and participate in seminar discussions. Evaluation is on the following basis:

Weekly Comments and Class Participation	25%
Three Essays (due: February 4, March 4, April 8)	75%

**Comments and Participation:** Before noon of the Thursday preceding each class meeting, you must post a comment to the class Moodle page on any one claim or argument drawn from that week's required readings. Your comment should consist of a brief observation or criticism, something that interests you, puzzles you, or seems incorrect to you (no longer than 300 words). Your comments will form the basis of our weekly discussions and will be assessed for your class participation grade, provided that you are present in the seminar on the relevant day. You may without penalty take two 'passes' and post no comment for that week.

**Essays:** The essays for the course are due on the dates indicated above. Essay topics will be distributed roughly two weeks in advance of the due date. All essays are required and should be 2500-3000 words in length (3000 words is a strict upper limit).

**Late Penalties:** Weekly comments are not accepted late; other work may be accepted late at the discretion of the course directors, subject to a penalty of 2.5% per calendar day or fraction thereof.

**PHIL 5801**

PHIL 5801, taken in conjunction with 5800, provides a forum for further discussion of central themes in contemporary theoretical philosophy. It is designed to prepare students to write the comprehensive exam in theoretical philosophy. It covers the same topics as PHIL 5800, with additional readings, discussions, and colloquia to broaden one's grasp of the field.

In addition to the required readings for PHIL 5800, students in 5801 are required to complete the required readings for PHIL 5801, as well as some or all of the recommended readings, to attend the discussion seminars and the departmental Philosophy Colloquium (a schedule is available). Evaluation will be based on a written comprehensive final exam in theoretical philosophy, which will range over the

eleven topics covered in this course. The exam will take place in mid- to late April, on a date to be decided. At the discretion of the course directors, students may also be asked to defend the written examination orally. A list of questions will be distributed in advance, from which the exam questions will be drawn.

### Reading Schedule

Readings with one asterisk (\*) are required for PHIL 5800, readings with two asterisks (\*\*) are required for PHIL 5801, and readings with no asterisk are recommended for PHIL 5801. All required and recommended readings are either available at the library (as electronic copies of journal articles, as e-book chapters, or as reserve materials) or are freely available on the web. Please consult with us if there are any readings that you are unable to locate.

#### January 4: **Introduction (BH & MAK)**

No readings assigned

#### January 11: **Metaphysics: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Naturalism (MAK)**

\* Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4 (1950): 20-40.

\* Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in *From a Logical Point of View* (1953)

\*\* Rosenberg, "Disenchanted Naturalism," in *Kritikos* (2015); <https://intertheory.org/rosenberg.htm>

Quine, W.V., "On What There Is," *Review of Metaphysics* 2 (1948/1949)

Davidson, D. "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 47 (1973), 5-20.

Alston, W.P., "Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 52 (1979), 779-808.

Putnam, H., "Pragmatic Realism", in Sosa and Kim.

Dennett, D. C. "Real Patterns," *Journal of Philosophy* 88 (1991), 27-51.

Child, W., "On the Dualism of Scheme and Content", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 94 (1994)

Eklund, M., "Carnap's Metaontology," *Nous* 47 (2013)

#### January 18: **Ontology: Individual Entities and Nihilism (BH)**

\* Dasgupta, S. "Quality and Structure," chapter 1 in Barnes, E., *Current Controversies in Metaphysics* (Routledge, 2016)

\* Turner, J. "Can We Do Without Fundamental Individuals?," chapter 2 in Barnes ↑

\* Dasgupta and Turner "Postscript," <http://shamik.net/papers/dasgupta%20postscript.pdf>

\*\* VanCleve, J. "Three Versions of the Bundle Theory," *Philosophical Studies* 47 (1985): 95-107.

Benovsky, J. "The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory: Deadly Enemies or Twin Brothers?," *Philosophical Studies* 141 (2008): 175-190.

Paul, L.A. "Logical Parts," *Nous* 36(4) (2009): 578-596.

Paul, L.A. "Building the World From its Fundamental Constituents," *Philosophical Studies* 158 (2012): 221-256.

Dasgupta, S. "Individuals," *Philosophical Studies* 145 (2009): 35-67.

#### January 25: **Natural Kinds (MAK)**

\* W.V. Quine, "Natural Kinds," *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (Columbia University Press, 1969)

\* T. E. Wilkerson, "Natural Kinds," *Philosophy* (1988)

\*\* J. Dupré, "Is 'Natural Kind' a Natural Kind Term?" *Monist* (2002)

D. H. Mellor, "Natural Kinds," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (1977)

- J. Dupré, "Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa," *Philosophical Review* 90 (1981)
- D. Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1983)
- R. Millikan, "Historical Kinds and the 'Special Sciences,'" *Philosophical Studies* 95 (1999)
- R. Boyd, "Realism, Foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds," *Philosophical Studies* 95 (1991)
- M. A. Khalidi, "Natural Kinds and Crosscutting Categories," *Journal of Philosophy* (1998)
- W. Child, "Triangulation: Davidson, realism and natural kinds," *Dialectica* (2001)
- I. Hacking, "Natural kinds: Rosy dawn, scholastic twilight," *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements* (2007).

#### February 1: **Time (BH)**

- \* McTaggart, J. "The Unreality of Time," 17(68) (1908): 457-474.
- \* Norton, J. "Relativity of Simultaneity," in *Einstein For Everyone* (online book) (2002):  
[https://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/teaching/HPS\\_0410/chapters/Special\\_relativity\\_rel\\_sim/index.html](https://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/teaching/HPS_0410/chapters/Special_relativity_rel_sim/index.html)
- \* Merricks, T. "Good-Bye Growing Block," in Zimmerman, D., *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 2* (Oxford, 2006).
- \*\* Heller, M. "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects," *Philosophical Studies* 46(3) (1984): 323-334.
- Merricks, T. "Endurance and Indiscernibility," *The Journal of Philosophy* 91(4) (1994): 165-184
- Markosian, N. "How Fast Does Time Pass?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53(4) (1993): 829-844.
- Prior, A. "The Notion of the Present," in Loux, M., *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (Routledge, 2001): 379-383.
- Mellor, D.H. "Thinking in Time," chapter 6 in *Real Time II* (Routledge, 1998) [e-book at library site]
- Mellor, D.H. "Change," chapter 8 in *RTII* ↑
- Black, M. "The Direction of Time," *Analysis* 19(3) (1959): 54-63.
- MacFarlane, J. "Future Contingents and Relative Truth," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 53(212) (2003): 321-336.
- Paul, L.A. "Temporal Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy* 107(7) (2010): 333-359.

#### February 8: **Mind-Body Reductionism & Functionalism (MAK)**

- \* D. Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 50 (1972)
- \* J. Fodor, "Special Science (or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)," *Synthese* 28 (1974)
- \*\* J. Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (1992)
- J. Dewey, S. Hook, & E. Nagel, "Are Naturalists Materialists?" *Journal of Philosophy*, 42 (1945), 515-530.
- D. Davidson, "The Material Mind," *Essays on Actions and Events* (1973)
- D. Dennett, "Real Patterns," *Journal of Philosophy* (1991)
- J. Fodor, "Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years," *Philosophical Perspectives* (1994)
- E. Sober, "The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism," *Philosophy of Science* 66 (1999), 542-564.
- L. A. Shapiro, "Multiple Realizations," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 97 (2000), 635-654.
- D. A. Weiskopf, "The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 62 (2011), 233-258.

#### February 15: **Panpsychism (BH)**

- \* Strawson, G. "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 13(10-11) (2006): 3-31.
- \* Chalmers, D. "The Combination Problem for Panpsychism," in Bruntrup and Jaskolla, *Panpsychism:*

*Contemporary Perspectives* (Oxford, 2016)

- \*\* Seager, W. "The Woke World: A Panpsychist Manifesto" [draft]
- Goff, P. "The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem," in Bruntrup and Jaskolla ↑
- Strawson, G. "The Consciousness Deniers," *The New York Review of Books* (March 13, 2018)  
<https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/>
- Dennett, D. and Strawson, G. "'Magic, Illusions, and Zombies': An Exchange," *The New York Review of Books* (April 3, 2018)  
<https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/04/03/magic-illusions-and-zombies-an-exchange/>
- Coleman, S. "Being Realistic: Why Physicalism May Entail Panpsychism," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 13(10-11) (2006): 40-52.
- Schaffer, J. "Monism: the Priority of the Whole," *Philosophical Review* 119(1) (2010): 31-76.
- Goff, P. "Orthodox Property Dualism + Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism," in Brown, R., *Consciousness Inside and Out* (Springer, 2014) [e-book at library site]

## February 22: **No Class – Reading Week**

### March 1: **Concepts (MAK)**

- \* T. Burge, "Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning," *Metaphilosophy* 24 (1993).
- \* J. Fodor, "Concepts: A Potboiler," *Cognition* 50 (1994).
- \*\* E. Camp, "Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78 (2009).
- C. Peacocke, "Possession Conditions: A Focal Point for Theories of Concepts," *Mind & Language* (1989)
- M. A. Khalidi, "Two Concepts of Concept," *Mind & Language* (1995)
- E. Machery, "Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind," *Philosophy of Science* (2006)
- E. Margolis and S. Laurence. "The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?" *Noûs*, 41 (2007), 561–93
- J. Beck, "Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology," *Protosociology*, 30: *Concepts: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives* (2013), 29–48.
- McCaffrey, J., & Machery, E. (2012). Philosophical issues about concepts. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science*, 3(2), 265-279.

### March 8: **Naturalized Epistemology (MAK)**

- \*W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (Columbia University Press, 1969)
- \*S. Stich, "Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism," in Hookway & Peterson (eds.), *Philosophy and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge University Press, 1993)
- \*\*P. Kitcher, "The Naturalists Return," *Philosophical Review* (1992)
- J. Kim, "What is Naturalized Epistemology?" *Philosophical Perspectives* 2 (1988) ed. Tomberlin, (Asascadero, CA: Ridgeview), pp. 381-406
- L. J. Cohen, "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (1981)
- L. Code, "What Is Natural about Epistemology Naturalized?" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33 (1996).
- H. Kornblith, "In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology" in *Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, ed. Greco and Sosa (Malden, Ma: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 158-169.
- R. Feldman, "Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology," in *Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, ed. Greco and Sosa (Malden, Ma: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 170-186.
- S. Stich and R. Samuels, "Rationality and Psychology," in *Oxford Handbook of Rationality* (Oxford University Press, 2004)

### March 15: Epistemology of Disagreement (BH)

- \* Elga, A. "Reflection and Disagreement," *Nous* 41(3) (2007): 478-502.
- \* Kelly, T. "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," chapter 6 in Feldman and Warfield, *Disagreement* (Oxford, 2010).
- \*\* Conee, E. "Rational Disagreement Defended," chapter 4 in Feldman and Warfield ↑
- \*\* Goldman, A. "Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement," chapter 8 in Feldman and Warfield ↑
- Elgin, C. "Persistent Disagreement," chapter 3 in Feldman and Warfield ↑ [e-book at library site]
- Kornblith, H. "Belief in the Face of Controversy," chapter 2 in Feldman and Warfield ↑
- van Inwagen, P. "We're Right. They're Wrong," chapter 1 in Feldman and Warfield ↑
- Elga, A. "How to Disagree about How to Disagree," chapter 7 in Feldman and Warfield ↑
- Fumerton, R. "You Can't Trust a Philosopher," chapter 5 in Feldman and Warfield ↑

### March 22: Intuitions and Philosophical Method (BH)

- \* Bealer, G. "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy," *Metaphilosophy* 38(1) (2007): 44-54.
- \* Cappelen, H. "Diagnostics for Intuitiveness," chapter 7 in *Philosophy Without Intuitions* (Oxford 2012).
- \* Cappelen, H. "Case Studies," chapter 8 in *PWI* ↑
- \*\* Williamson, T. "Evidence in Philosophy," chapter 7 in *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (Oxford 2007).
- Cappelen, H. "Centrality and Philosophical Practice," chapter 6 in *PWI* ↑ [e-book at library site]
- Cappelen, H. "Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson," chapter 9 in *PWI* ↑
- Bealer, G. "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge," *Philosophical Perspectives* 10 (1996): 1-34.
- Hubner, D. "Three Remarks on 'Reflective Equilibrium'," *Philosophical Inquiry* 41(1) (2017): 11-40.

### March 29: Experimental Philosophy: Negative and Positive (MAK & BH)

- \* Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions," *Philosophical topics* (2001)
- \* Schwitzgebel, E. & Cushman, F. "Philosophers' Biased Judgements Persist Despite Training, Expertise, and Reflection," *Cognition* 141 (2015): 127-137.
- \*\* Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P., "Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style," *Cognition* (2004)
- Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S., & Stich, S., "Against arguments from reference," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2009).
- Haggqvist, S. & Wikforss, A., "Experimental Semantics: The Case of Natural Kind Terms," in *Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language* (2015).
- Cohnitz, D. "The Metaphilosophy of Language," in *Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language* (2015).
- Marti, G., "General Terms, Hybrid Theories, and Ambiguity," in *Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language* (2015).
- Nichols, S., Pinillos, N. A., & Mallon, R., "Ambiguous Reference," *Mind* (2016)
- Sosa, E. "Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition," *Philosophical Studies* 132 (2007): 99-107.
- Nagel, J., San Juan V., & Mar, R. "Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs," *Cognition* 129 (2013): 652-661.
- Knobe, J. "Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation," *Philosophical Psychology* 16 (2003): 309-324.

**Comprehensive Exam – to be scheduled for some time in April**